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Abstract 
Shareholders rely on accounting figures that do not indicate true performance and are 
known to be easily manipulated. Manager incentives, which are focused on these figures, 
must be changed in order to reward managers for honest corporate governance. The 
pursuit of corporate governance requires adjustments to internal reports and valuation 
methods. Economic Value Added (EV A) is a method that truly measures economic 
value and requires managers to return the cost of capital to lenders and shareholders. 
Some companies that have not required a minimum return from investment projects have 
gotten themselves into financial ruin arid even turned to COlTUpt behavior. Cases of 
cOl1uption involving Enron and Tyco will be analyzed with a focus on the reasons of 
corruption. Incentive plans utilizing EVA valuation standards will be discussed as 
solutions. EVA implementation will be proven to serve as a more accurate method of 
valuing a company's worth and manager performance. This will serve to deter dishonest 
practices and encourage managers for making decisions in the best interest of 
shareholders. 
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Economic Value Added: The Accurate Method of Company Valuation 
and Just Compensation for Management. 
Turmoil in corporate accounting in recent years has been rampant. Scandals and 
conuption have led President Bush to create an oversight board in 2002 in order to 
regulate accounting and reporting procedures. These new procedures seek to stop 
dishonest practices such as exaggerating returns and other measures that mislead 
investors. However, many respectable managers have been implementing "creative 
accounting" methods which distort their company's true performance. To most, there 
seems to be nothing wrong, as long as company executives remain within the confines of 
the law. Bending accounting rules may not be strictly illegal, but it distorts profits and 
returns at the very least. 
Greed and dishonesty cannot be blamed in themselves for these actions since they 
have always been present in business. The underlying problem is that bookkeeping has 
become disconnected from value. In addition, there is a great separation between the 
ownership and control ofpublic1y held companies. The authors of the book, The EVA 
Challenge write, "although numerous shareholders own a public corporation, control 
over its operations is in the hands of professional managers, who typically hold relatively 
few shares and whose interests often diverge from those of the silent majority of 
shareholders" (Stem and Shiely 2). 
Managers that act in the interests of shareholders are exercising what is known as 
"corporate governance" (Young and O'Byrne 35). However, they often have a greater 
concern for their own financial interests. Some managers of Enron and Tyco are just two 
recent 
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examples (Stewart, "Enron" 2). The result is a conflict of interest that reduces 
shareholder value. 
Although shareholders lack the information held by management, shareholders 
attempt to examine performance by observing financial figures that accountants use. Net 
profit after taxes (NPAT) and earnings per share (EPS) are scrutinized most since they 
are thought to be the best indicators of company performance (Martin and Petty 136). 
U sing these "bottom line" figures is a misleading method since accounting reports distort 
true economic performance. This is not to say accountants are usually dishonest, but 
rather they must abide by the conservative reporting measures outlined by Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The conservative nature of these guidelines 
often underestimates the value of a company. This is no surprise, as companies began 
(and continue) to report quarterly to lenders who are mainly focused on the down-side of 
risk. Accordingly, accountants report the value of assets in the case of default on debt 
payments (Stern and Shiely 8). However, shareholders are not concerned with the 
reported book value as lenders are, but rather are interested in a company's market value. 
Adjustments to Financial Statements 
The following two sections concern required changes necessary to income 
statements and balance sheets. These changes will allow for a more accurate valuation of 
a company. It is important to remember that these changes will only be made to internal 
reports used by management, not public filings that follow GAAP. 
The Income Statement 
Traditionally, accountants have expensed research and development (R&D). This 
means that outlays for R&D are deducted from revenue, even though the benefits are 
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often recognized in the following years (Stewart "Accounting" 5). Expensing R&D 
yields an understated profit for the year which lowers tax liability. Allocation 
requirements of R&D vary by company, but those that require massive amounts of R&D 
include high-tech firms and pharmaceutical companies. Expensing R&D for these 
companies severely underestimates their net profit and EPS. 
Marketing and advertising outlays are also expensed. This practice may seem 
logical to those who view the effects of advertising to be brief. However, marketing and 
advertising efforts have lasting effects that build brand value (Stern and Shiely 4). It is 
true that estimating the duration of marketing and advertising effects is not exact. 
However, even a rough estimation of the duration is superior to expensing a large outlay 
at a single time. For example, soft drink and fast-food companies are just two of the 
many industries that aim at building recognition and acceptance in the years ahead of the 
outlays. The same method of expensing applies to quality improvement programs and 
training personnel, which are large expenditures for companies in the insurance and 
banking industries (Freeman 60). 
A logical solution to the expensing of the budgets mentioned would include 
counting them as investments instead. This requires capitalizing the outlays on the 
balance sheet as an asset and writing it off over its useful life. This can be done in all 
three categories mentioned: R&D, marketing and advertising, and employee training 
programs. 
The Balance Sheet 
GAAP also underestimates value stated on the balance sheet. For instance, an 
asset such as a building is valued at either its original cost less depreciation, or its market 
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value. The lower value of the two is listed. Also, the market usually rises with time 
which will therefore understate the value of an asset. For example, a $25 million 
manufacturing plant bought in the past may now be valued at $35 million but would be 
carried on the balance sheet as $15 million because of the $10 million written off for 
depreciation. This methodology understates value and tax liability once again. 
"Pooling" two companies together versus purchasing is another problem with the 
balance sheet. A company may purchase another by means of buying it outright with 
cash or by purchasing the shares of the desired company. Pooling the two companies 
simply involves putting the assets of both companies onto one balance sheet. This action 
does not record a purchase premium so that neither company's earnings are affected. On 
the contrary, purchasing a company with cash may adversely affect earnings if the 
purchase price is higher than the "fair" asset value (Stewart, "Accounting" 8). This 
excess amount is listed on the balance sheet as "goodwill" and is amortized for up to 40 
years. For each of these years, the amortized expense depresses net income. Although 
pooling and purchasing have the same intent and end result, purchases are inappropriately 
penalized. 
It is important to note that GAAP procedures must be followed for legal repOliing 
purposes. However, these adjustments are to be made on internal management reports, 
which are used to make useful decisions in light of economic reality. 
Manipulations in Accounting 
The distortions of accounting procedures are not the only problem created for 
shareholders. Calculations are easily manipulated. Profits can be boosted by cutting 
back expenses like marketing and advertising even when this decision is determined to be 
Economic Value Added 8 
disadvantageous for the company. Another method involves managers persuading their 
customers (often retailers) to purchase additional inventory. Often, retailers agree 
because of the lengthened or more lenient credit terms offered as incentives. Sales are 
conveniently recorded on the shipping date just before the end of the period (Young and 
O'Byrne 98). Despite improving the results of managers and customers, there is no real 
value added to the company or its shareholders. Only the bonus of the manager is 
increased since it is tied to a rise in EPS. 
SEC chairman, Arthur Levett 1r. addresses other earning schemes that artificially 
boost EPS. Management may overstate restructuring expenses, which often includes 
such costs as shutting down a factory and paying severance pay to laid-off employees. 
This is often overlooked since it is a one-time cost that is not carefully estimated by 
others (qtd. in Stern 25). Mergers and acquisitions may also be manipulated as a 
corporation may call the majority of the price "in process research and development" 
(Stern 26). This amount can be written off instantly, which serves to understate earnings. 
Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet, has also expressed his opinion 
of corporate executives that mislead their shareholders. In his company's 1999 annual 
report he states: 
Many major companies still play things straight, but a significant and 
growing number of otherwise high grade managers- CEOs you would be 
happy to have as spouses for your children or trustees under your will-
have come to the view that it's okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what 
they believe are Wall Street's desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind 
of manipulation is not only okay, but actually their duty. (Buffet 12) 
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Manipulating games initiated by executives will be difficult to stop so long as 
bonuses are paid in direct proportion to EPS increases. Recognizing this problem, 
participants in favor of corporate governance have sought to promote using other 
earnings measurements. The most common measurements are Return on Equity (ROE), 
Return on Investment (ROI), and Return on Net Assets (RONA). These indicators 
include figures from the balance sheet which make them better than EPS, but they can 
also be manipulated. ROE, if not improved by performance can be increased by 
management opting to buy back shares in order to reduce the number of shares 
outstanding (Stern and Shiely 13). ROI is simple, but can be used in a manipulative 
manner. The amount gained from an investment (in the numerator of the equation) may 
?e revenue or another figure such as net income. Dividing these figures by the initial 
outlay of the project or investment will yield completely different answers. 
Likewise, RONA can be boosted at the end of the period by quickly selling off 
assets. With fewer assets, management will be able to state a higher return on net assets. 
Managers with bonuses tied to increasing RONA also have the incentive to deny a wise 
acquisition since adding a large asset to the total would reduce the overall return 
(StewaIi, "Accounting" 12). 
'fraditionally, the level of compensation paid to executives increases with the size 
of the company. Few question this reasoning since larger companies CaITY larger 
responsibilities. However, growing laI'ger does not ensure greater wealth for 
shareholders; better management does (Stern and StewaI127). Therefore, a method is 
needed that can stop the manipulation of financial reports. A measuring stick is 
necessary to accurately assess the value of an enterprise as well as management's true 
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performance. This method must be difficult for management to manipulate, and 
meaningful to shareholders. Once a company is accurately valued and performance is 
gauged correctly, proper incentives can be put into place which will reward managers 
who serve the interests of the shareholders. 
The desire for such a method is not new. Adolf Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, to 
Columbia University professors in the 1930s, addressed the need to align the goals of 
managers with shareholder goals in their book, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (ref. in Stern 2). The basic concept of measuring true profit for shareholders 
has been referred to as economic profit (Martin and Petty 80). Finding a reliable way to 
determine economic profit has been a problem facing managers ever since it was 
identified. Economic Value Added, known as EV A, was introduced by Stern Stewart & 
Co. in 1989. The goal of EVA is simple: Align the interests of management with the 
interests of shareholders. Today, there are over one hundred companies that focus on 
raising a single EV A figure in order to benefit themselves, the enterprise, and most 
importantly the shareholders (Grant·9). 
The Missing Link: Cost of Capital 
When investors decide to place their funds in a company, they expect a given rate 
of return that is above the nearly risk-free rate offered by government securities. 
However, traditionally both managers and accountants have treated this equity capital as 
free, which fails to place any value on the funds that shareholders have invested into a 
business. This is not only inaccurate, but an example of poor stewardship of the 
resources given to an enterprise (Mt. 25.14-30). 
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Failure to consider a cost of capital often leads to reporting a profit despite actually 
cutting shareholder value (Yoong 2). By accounting for economic profit, corporate 
performance is measured by subtracting the total cost of resources associated with 
generating revenue, which includes equity capital (Stern 18). The basic formula follows: 
Economic Profit = Accounting Profit - The Cost of Equity 
The cost of capital is an opportunity cost which is the return that shareholders 
expect given a level of risk. The firm must deliver this return at the very least in order to 
return an economic profit to the investor. The expected rate of return depends on the 
level of risk and usually varies 2 t07 percent above the risk-free returns of government 
securities (Ka-Neng Au 2). Economic profit is often significantly lower than the 
accounting profit. A company may have an accounting profit of $10 million, but if it ties 
up $100 million on its balance sheet, it will actually report an economic loss of $2 million 
if its cost of capital is 12% as shown below: 
Economic Profit = Accounting Profit - (Cost of Equity % x $Equity Capital) 
- $2 Million = $10 Million (12% x $100 Million) 
As shown, economic profit is a superior indicator than accounting profit because it 
measures how efficient a company is at using the resources of shareholders. Neglecting 
the cost of capital has greatly misinformed investors for years. In 2001, combined net 
income of 1,000 of the largest companies in the U.S. totaled $96 billion while the cost of 
the capital (figured at 10% of book equity) was over three times that amount (Stewart 
"Accounting" 5). 
Solving this problem requires a simple change: earnings should be charged with a 
debit (for the cost of equity) and this charge can be added back by crediting book equity. 
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Measuring the cost of equity is not exact nor is it easy because the true cost of funds 
cannot be known precisely; it is a forward-looking expectation that cannot be known 
(Gray 9). Research conducted by Fama and French, two leading experts on the 
quantification of uncertainty suggests that the cost of the equity portion of funds stems 
from the risk premium (Rm-Rf) and the risk loading beta, which are both estimated with 
error (Fama 155). Therefore, estimating the cost of equity will have a margin of elTor. In 
a study that followed, Fama and French reported that there is at least a 3% elTor interval 
around the mean given a 95% confidence level (Fama and French 180). 
Three percent is a substantial range of elTor. However, even if the cost is not 
perfectly assigned (i.e., 10% when actual cost is 7% or 13%), it is superior to the 
complete neglect of this cost used by traditional accounting practices. 
Capital Misallocation 
Investment decisions are also poorly affected by traditional accounting methods. 
Management is more inclined to finance an investment project through debt rather than 
equity financing in order to report higher EPS and ROE (Stern and Shiely 4). This is 
because traditional accounting only requires the interest portion of the loan to be covered 
and both earnings and returns will be reported. The investment would have to yield a 
much greater return if it is financed with the issue of stock. Therefore, managers are 
rewarded for increasing the level of debt financing, which may be a misallocation of 
capital, instead of increasing actual returns. Enron became an example of this when it 
announced, "We are laser-focused on earnings-per-share" (Enron Annual Report 2). 
Their actions were followed by rapidly increasing debt financing to dangerously high 
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levels in order to boost EPS. The underlying problem is that managers are motivated to 
trade wise allocation of capital for a seemingly better financial report. 
Description of EV A 
As a solution, financing costs should be subtracted after operating results are 
figured. Dividing Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) by the firms total debt and 
equity yields the true operating results without regard to how the debt is financed. This 
method is therefore a better indicator than ROE. Once financing costs are removed from 
NOPAT, the weighted average cost of capital can be subtracted from NOP AT. The 
following formula yields the EV A: 
EVA = NOPAT - (% Capital x $ Total Cost of Capital) 
For example, if a firm has a total capital of $1 billion (from lenders and investors) 
and their cost of capital is figured at 9%, their capital charge of $90 million ($1 billion x 
9%) represents the minimum NOPAT required to break even in economic profit. This 
means that interest has been paid on debt after taxes and meets the 9% return that 
shareholders demand. From this point, actual NOPAT should be compared to the 
NOPAT break even point or "threshold" (Grant 17). If it is greater than the threshold, 
wealth has been created for shareholders. If it is lower, then wealth has been destroyed. 
Once a company determines the NOPAT figure to be accurate, it must look to the 
other parts of the formula. As mentioned earlier, figuring the cost of capital (required 
rate of return) demanded by shareholders is not precise. This percentage must 
compensate investors for the perceived amount of risk they are undertaking. This rate, 
made of two parts, varies by industry and type of business. The first part called cost of 
debt capital is equal to the after-tax interest rate of the company's borrowings (Roztocki 
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16). The other part called cost of equity capital begins with the risk-free rate of long-
term government securities which is typically 6% (Ka-Neng 3). The equity risk 
premium, which varies on the type of project is added. This p0l1ion usually varies from 
as low as 1 % (i.e. grocery chain) to 7% (i.e. a film production company) (Stern and 
Shiely 19). Combining the debt and equity p0l1ions of the cost of capital brings the 
majority of businesses to a 7% to 13% cost of capital. 
Before calculating EVA, it is important to ensure that NOPAT is figured 
correctly. If the traditional net profit bottom line were used, the economic profit would 
be understated. This is because from the shareholder's point of view there are a number 
of current expenses that should be placed as assets on the balance sheet (Stern and 
Stewart 32). EVA experts have identified over 150 accounting "anomalies", which are 
placements that can distort true results. However, most companies only require 5 to 10 
adjustments to make their NOPAT accurate (Stewart, "Accounting" 18). The handful of 
changes made must be identified and explained to management so that they can be 
understood and their decisions can now better serve the interests of the shareholders. 
Pitfalls of Poor Incentive Plans 
Whether or not employers and employees like to admit it, one of the best ways to 
motivate workers is through monetary bonuses. An effectively designed incentive plan 
will encourage workers to use assets carefully, invest in the right projects, to seize new 
opportunities, and most of all to deliver performance that adds value (Martin 161). 
Ultimately, incentives should aim to make employees better stewards of the resources 
given to them, something all companies desire from their workers. 
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Managers must be warned of the potential harm incentive plans can have. Poor 
incentive plans can have a negative result in an enterprise if they are not first carefully 
designed. Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, stresses the absolute importance 
of properly designed incentive plans (qtd. in Stewart, "Enron Signals the End" 14). 
A common mistake made in incentive design is to base bonuses on a measure that 
gives the wrong signal. An example, outlined by Bennett Stewart III., of Stern Stewart & 
Co. is rewarding solely on such measurements as sales, earnings, or market share 
(Stewart, "How to Structure" 3). These may be strong indicators, but managing from an 
indicator that is easily manipulated may narrow the focus of management to the extent of 
ignoring other impOliant measures. Being unable to associate daily decisions to 
achieving bonuses is another pitfall faced by many companies (Young and O'Byrne 350). 
Another mistake, according to Joel Stern, is rewarding managers for meeting budget 
goals. It is not that meeting budget goals is negative in itself, but rather mangers will be 
motivated to set minimal goals in order to be rewarded a bonus every time (14). 
Short-term (a year or less) focused incentives without long-term incentives leaves 
little motivation to invest in long-term projects. Short-sighted goals also tempt 
management to manipulate accounting measures like EPS (Stewart, "Accounting" 16). A 
prime example of short-sighted goals that led to conuption can be found in the Enron 
case. Their annual repOli admitted their obsession with short-term results (Enron annual 
report 2001 3). 
Using EVA to Create the Optimal Incentive Plan 
A tailored approach must be taken for EVA implementation. Such factors as 
organizational structure, business strategy, risk tolerance, and company culture are major 
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factors to consider when designing the plan (Young and O'Byrne 85). The most 
important consideration is to make every employee think and act like an owner. This 
consideration of course is simple in theory, but difficult in implementing. To 
demonstrate, the following principles to be discussed are taught by EVA experts such as 
Bennett Stewart III and Joel Stern who have successfully trained fortune 500 companies 
such as The Coca-Cola Company and Eli Lilly and Company. 
Improvement. Unlike traditional bonuses, EV A incentives are not only paid to 
top management, but to every employee who is improving EVA from the previous 
period. Improvement in EVA therefore "levels the playing field" whereby, "Talented 
managers and employees can be just as motivated to join tough businesses that need to be 
turned around and restmctured as to join the best business" (Stewart, "How to Stmcture" 
10). Improvement bonuses are always in reach, which can even be attained by managers 
who feel as though their stock price has reached its high. This solves the problem of 
managers who leave small companies once they have matured to search for gains at 
another firm. 
Common concentration. A single measure that is not easy to manipulate allows 
for a central and simple focus for all employees. Traditionally, companies reward 
production teams differently than sales teams. Vying for different goals can lead to 
cross-functional disagreement, which fosters poor cooperation. Multiple goals can cause 
confusion, as juggling 10 measures is difficult. For instance, an analogy of determining 
the best basketball team is made by Bennett Stewart III: Adding blocks, rebounds, field 
goal percentage, free throws, and penalties together will not objectively tell which team is 
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the best. The best team is determined by the highest score. Likewise, EVA is the single 
measure of score for an enterprise (Stewart "How to Stmcture" 18). 
Substantial incentive. The bonus oppOltunity must be large enough to motivate 
managers to make the most value-creating decisions, even the difficult ones. Bonuses 
tied to creating value must be more attractive than pleasing the sources of both internal 
and external pressure. Misallocating capital in order to reach budget goals is a typical 
example of internal pressure, while external pressure may be felt by investor 
expectations. As mentioned earlier, a substantial incentive is best tied to increasing 
EV A. The following is a simplified example that highlights the effectiveness of an EV A 
incentive plan: 
Sales 
Costs (including taxes) 
NOPAT 
Capital 
X cost of capital 
Capital Charge 
EVA 
EV A (previous year) 
Increase in EV A 
$100,000,000 
(80,000,000) 
20,000,000 
150,000,000 
10% 
(15,000,000) 
5,000,000 
4,000,000 
$1,000,000 +25% 
In the example above, management subtracted a $15,000,000 capital charge from 
the $20,000,000 of net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) to get a positive EV A 
number of 5,000,000. Management has determined an EVA expected growth rate of 
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25%. A "bonus pool" has also been determined for every employee that meets the 
targeted EVA growth rate. In this case, EV A is increased by 25 % (reached an EV A of $5 
million which is increased from $4 million the previous year) which meets the targeted 
growth rate. This incentive plan can prove to be generous as each deserving employee 
will receive a 100% of their specified cash bonus for achieving the goal. Higher level 
managers will have a greater bonus pool than lower level employees (i.e. $20,000 vs. 
$2,000). 
Unlimited bonus. Most companies limit the bonus amount to a ceiling of 1.5 
times the target bonus (Stewart "How to Structure" 13). Bonuses must be uncapped as 
Fortune Magazine executive editor Geoffrey Colvin states, "When a company caps 
bonuses, something is wrong. Somehow, leadership, organization, measurement, 
decision-making, and incentives are not aligned with shareholder value. If they were, 
limiting bonuses would be foolish" (16). EVA can promise unlimited bonus potential 
since there is no limit on how much value that can be added. Bonuses will continually 
rise as long as economic profit continues to increase. In the previous example, if a 
functional unit of a company achieved twice the bonus (in this case, raising EV A by 50% 
in a period) they would receive twice the specified cash bonus. 
Sustainability. The board of directors must take precautions so as to ensure that 
EV A figures can be maintained. As a solution, holding back or "banking" large bonuses 
can be done. Up to half the bonus is paid in the first year, and the remaining portion is 
paid annually over the following years. Banking bonuses maintains a high level of 
motivation as managers may lose them if performance levels decline. This approach 
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incorporates the benefits of using traditional stock options that can decrease in similar 
penalties. 
Definitive. An accurate assessment of manager performance can only be done 
when expectations and goals are clearly communicated. Ambiguous goals and bonuses 
that are difficult to estimate will hinder a manager's motivation. Stern Stewmi & Co. has 
discovered that a successful approach is to develop a formula that rewards improvement 
in EV A as a percentage. Such implementation has attributed managerial success for The 
Coca-Cola Co. and Oppenheimer Capital (Stern 33). 
Community. Community is the final principle outlined by Stern & Stewart & 
Co.' s EVA incentive program. Every employee must have EV A incentive potential. 
Bonus plan structures must all have similarities as this promotes high morale and the 
common quest to create value for shareholders. 
Incentive Implementation Cases: Diageo PLC and Guidant Corp. 
EVA encourages accountability; it organizes a system whereby each individual 
knows what is expected of them, what job needs to be done by when, and how the results 
will be measured. Teams are made to work together to make decisions. For example, 
John McGrath, CEO of Diageo PLC, a leading consumer goods company, established a 
"global peer group" of 19 direct competitors, with top competitors like Gillette and 
Nestle in the mix. McGrath made it clear that bonus maximization was in reach for 
excellent performance. Using a Long Term Incentive Program (L-TIP) he outlined the 
benefits. Fifth place ensures 100% of the agreed upon bonus. Fourth place wins 125%, 
and the top three spots are rewarded with 150% of the bonus. Fifth to tenth place offered 
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a smaller, sliding scale bonus that fell from 100% gradually. If Diageo failed to make the 
top ten, the executives would receive no bonus. McGrath could confidently implement 
this type of incentive program since 90% of shareholders approved it at the annual 
general meeting ("EVA in Action" 1). 
Critics of long-term incentive programs argue that bonuses may still be rewarded 
to companies that have performed poorly despite beating some competitors. Diageo and 
other L-TIP implementers have acknowledged this as a legitimate argument, but claim 
that fallout may be avoided with the proper safeguards: Under EV A valuation standards, 
bonuses will never be paid if wealth is not created for shareholders. Above this, the 
remuneration committee must agree that economic profit is growing at an acceptable rate 
before bonuses are awarded (Stewart, "How to Structure" 8). 
In regard to the remuneration (or finance) committee, it must be acknowledged 
that cOlTuption can still exist if these members have ulterior motives. Enron's 
committee was partly composed of "old friends" of the executives as well as members 
who were permissive in corrupt practices that served their own interests (Stewmt, "Enron 
Signals the End" 4). Members that do not have a previous interest in the firm should be 
selected to safeguard against dishonest practice. 
Guidant Corp., a medical device company, also implements an effective EV A-
based incentive program. Chairman James Comelius was seeking to motivate managers 
to be top-performers in 1995. He decided to contract with the Stem Stewart team to 
develop EVA performance targets. In addition, every manager was given stock options 
in efforts to align their own success to the success of the company. Managers set 
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performance bonuses with time frames that were responded to with an unprecedented 
level of product innovation (McGrath 1). 
In four years time, Guidant Corp. multiplied their share price ten times and added 
$105 million in EVA profits (McGrath 1). When asked to comment on the effectiveness 
of EV A implementation, Cornelius responded: 
I'm convinced these results are largely because of EVA and because our 
people have stock ownership in the company. They keep looking for 
ways to improve our business because at the end of the day a significant 
share of their annual cash bonuses are tied to EVA improvement and to 
holdings of Guidant stock in their benefit and retirement plans. They can 
see and share in the results of their own efforts. (3) 
Corruption Cases: Enron and Tyco 
Case #1,' Enron C01p. 
As noted earlier, management bonuses at top companies are often tied to an 
earnings figure such as earnings-per-share. Managers of Enron are a prime example of 
being motivated to raise EPS in a manipulative way. The demise of Enron can very 
much be linked to their "laser focus on earnings-per-share" (Enron 2001 annual report 2). 
There were a number of ways in which the executives of Enron manipulated EPS. The 
"superficial attraction" to increasing EPS may be attributed to a commonly used formula 
to estimate stock prices: 
Price = EPS x PIE 
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This methodology tells an investor that a company that delivers $5 in EPS and trades for 
20 times its earnings (PIE) will be wOlih $100 per share. With so many investors 
watching EPS and management incentives linked to it, there is no wonder that 
there is pressure to raise it. Raising EPS to $6 will boost the stock price to $120 per 
share. The appeal of using a stock price formula is in its simplicity. However, it makes 
the incorrect assumption that the PIE ratio will remain the same. In reality, PIE ratios can 
and do change due to such factors as new strategy implementation and investment 
allocations (Young and O'Byrne 134). 
Over-investing capital is one of the surest ways to boost EPS. Financing projects 
with debt capital usually only requires the 4 or 5% return to meet the cost of capital 
(Stewart, "Enron Signals the End" 2). However, equity capital (capital from 
shareholders), requires a much higher return, often 10 to 12% (Copeland, Koller, and 
Murrin 176). In an effort to maximize EPS, Enron poured billions of dollars into low-
return investments that averaged a 7% return on capital (Stewart, "Enron Signals the 
End" 5). Since the return was much lower than the cost of capital, Enron was setting 
itself up for failure. 
Over-leveraging the balance sheet was another method used by the executives of 
Enron. Heavy debt financing is the obvious course of action for managers who are 
frantically trying to boost EPS. In Enron's case, debt-financing was employed far 
beyond cautious levels. Lenders and investors caught on and were suddenly unwilling to 
provide the fast financing required for Enron to deliver their expected EPS figure 
(Stewart, "Enron Signals the End" 7). 
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The problem with management in many companies is executives being given a 
single focus to raise earnings. A single earnings figure will lead to disaster as it did with 
Enron. Boosting EPS, if not through genuine performance, will always tempt managers 
to bOlTOW too much and offer too few new shares in order to raise reported earnings as 
high as possible. As Bennett Stewart noted, "EPS is the opium of the executive suite; it 
is the Don Juan of corporate value. As Enron discovered, worshipping at the EPS alter 
can lift a top team to a prominent pedestal in the short run but drag them down to a fiery 
grave in the longer term" ("How to Structure" 7). 
EV A methodology raises expectations for management. An enterprise can 
misallocate or over-invest capital, increase sales, and even increase EPS and still reduce 
EVA. However, since EVA measures the wealth created for shareholders, a positive 
EV A will mean increased EPS (Grant 27). The beauty of EVA above its simplicity is 
that it places pressure on management to add real value. Managers may only receive a 
bonus once the determined cost of capital (debt and equity mix) has been returned to 
lenders and investors. 
If the managers of Enron were utilizing an EV A incentive plan, they would not 
have been rewarded for their highest years of EPS gains (1998-2000). In fact, their 
dishonest efforts of over-investing and over-leveraging would never have been 
acceptable. The meager 7% rate of return would not have met the 10 or 12% required 
return needed to accept the increased leverage for the investment projects (Stewart 
"Enron Signals the End" 5). Enron CFO, Andrew Fastow, would not have been able to 
fuel his bonus since he was not returning the cost of the capital borrowed from 
shareholders. 
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As the chart below indicates (Stewart, "Enron Signals the End" 6) the three 
highest years of reported EPS returned the largest bonuses to Enron executives. 
However, EVA valuation would not have paid a single dollar in bonuses since it grew 
increasingly negative. Managers who destroy EVA are not rewarded since they have not 
met the demands of shareholders. EVA is indeed a tool that holds management 
accountable to creating wealth for shareholders first. 
NCit Inc EPg 
$"1.40 
$"1.20 
$1.00 
$O.SO 
$0.60 
$0.40 
$0.20 
$0.00 
96 97 99 99 '00 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Had raising EVA been the focus for management in the beginning, the temptation 
to manipulate a single figure like EPS would not have existed. Misallocating investor 
capital and over-leveraging the balance sheet would be avoided as they would be judged 
as an unsatisfactory investment. EVA cannot be manipulated nearly as easily because it 
incorporates the expectations of overall economic performance. 
Case #2: Tyco International 
The American-based conglomerate, Tyco International, is another example of a 
company engaged in corruption that could have been deterred in part by EV A valuation 
and compensation methods. Although there were numerous instances of corruption, the 
largest practices will be discussed. 
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CEO Kazlowski was accused of purchasing multi-million dollar items for himself 
with company debt, which allowed him to avoid paying income tax. The conglomerate 
itself raised suspicion as it paid CFO Mark Swartz $170 million over a three year period 
(Colvin 16). Much of the earnings were in bonus dollars fueled by rapid acquisitions. 
These acquisitions were financed by stock that was used to over-leverage the growing 
conglomerate. Earnings increased annually by 20% during the early nineties, which 
fattened the pockets of executives whose bonuses were tied to earnings. While the 
executives increased their wealth, the funds of shareholders were being used against 
themselves. Earnings were pushed by the $27 billion of capital debt from lenders and 
investors (Stewart "Enron Signals the End" 7). 
As with the Enron example, the pressure to run earnings up, this time through 
over-valued acquisitions, would not have existed with EVA valuation and compensation. 
The 20% annual returns would not have been deemed satisfactory given the level of 
capital required to do so. 
As SEC Commissioner Harvey Pitt said, "There is no true number in accounting, 
and if there were, auditors would be the last to find it." (qtd. In Stewart, "Accounting is 
Broken" 8). Accounting manipulation and fraud would not hold to the scrutiny of EV A. 
Economic profit cannot be manipulated; it must be substantiated through the delivery of 
an actual return. Increased earnings are simply not enough. 
Conclusion 
The Goals of EVA: Accuracy, Accountability, Honesty 
The introduction described the problem of corrupt practices and dishonest 
reporting. Dishonest motives still lead to corrupt practice and therefore EVA 
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implementation in itself cannot rid corporate America of such harm. Instead, it serves as 
a detelTent in the three ways that were discussed in the previous sections. 
First, managers and the finance committee are held accountable to shareholders 
and lenders. EVA requires more than a net profit, but a relevant economic profit in 
which success begins once value is added to shareholders. The proper adjustments are 
made to internal financial statements which serve to accurately gauge performance. 
Second, the temptation to manipulate figures is discouraged since compensation is 
no longer tied to earnings. Incentives are based on increasing EVA, which requires 
returning the cost of capital used. Actions to misallocate capital, avoid long-term 
investments, and over-leverage the balance sheet are discouraged simply because they 
will not increase management's bonus. Instead, incentives are linked directly to 
rewarding shareholders. 
Third-and most of all, EVA promotes honesty. Tme performance is measured 
instead of profit and earnings by traditional accounting standards. Therefore, the relevant 
economic results are gauged. Managers are not rewarded for manipulating particular 
figures, but rather have an incentive to raise a number that can only be done through 
honest results. 
The End Results 
A tailored EVA plan is one that incorporates every employee from top managers 
down to the manual laborers in a factory. Unity among all employees encourages every 
individual to think and act as if they owned the company. Since valuation is accurate and 
compensation is tied to increasing value, cross-functional teams are able to cooperate in 
efforts that are rewarded simultaneously. Resources are used efficiently with an expected 
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level of return in mind. Bonus earnings are unlimited and motivation is based on honest 
results. Shareholders benefit in equal measure from EV A implementation as the money 
that they have invested is put to use in a manner that meets their expectations. 
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